Show Of Hands

National Review and Strategic Forecasting advance two divergent and yet compelling takes on what is going through the mind of Russian Czar Vladimir Putin.

NR argues that Russia had achieved all its tactical and immediate strategic aims from its invasion of Georgia....:

It had subdued its fractious, independent neighbor. All but one of the energy pipelines between Central Asia and Western Europe were under its direct control — and the single exception was but a few hours away by tank. A stern lesson had been sent to former Soviet possessions, inside and outside the Commonwealth of Independent States, that they live in Russia’s zone of influence and must conform to Russian foreign policy. The European Union had forsworn any criticism of Moscow’s open aggression to protect its own status as a “mediator.” The U.S. had failed to offer any real succor to Georgia.

....but then "overplayed a very strong hand" by failing to quit while it was ahead, sending its troops "roving around Georgia destroying any property, including railway bridges and docks, that might conceivably have a military use."  An action technically allowed and actively encouraged by the first ceasefire "brokered" by the French.  These excesses "provoked" a show of solidarity in Tbilisi between Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili and his counterparts from the ex-Soviet provinces of Poland, Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia; a slightly reduced level of punchless flaccidity from the Bush Administration in the form of humanitarian aid and a more balanced ceasefire not-quite-ultimatum delivered by SecState Condi Rice; expansion of the Western anti-missile shield to include new bases in Poland and Ukriane; and renewed momentum for extending NATO membership to Ukraine and what's left of Georgia.

NR's editors draw a parallel between Russia's attack on Georgia and the Soviet "invasion" of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and contend that because Russian tanks haven't (yet) captured Tbilisi and Russian troops haven't dragged President Saakashvili away in chains to a Siberian labor camp, and because the former Soviet provinces on Russia's western border haven't fallen into line behind Moscow in backing its giant neighbor's rape of the tiny Caucasus state, and because the Western reaction this time was nominally less feckless than the one forty years ago, today's crisis is far less of a triumph for the Russkies.

The flaw in that argument is rather obvious: the Red Army's crushing of the "Prague Spring" was an internal security matter of the Empire, not one soveriegn nation-state invading another.  The Warsaw Pact's endorsement was provincial governors following orders from Moscow.  The West's lack of response mattered far less then than it does now, because the rape of Georgia is the first overt step back toward the reconstruction of the dreaded USSR.

To be fair, NR caveatizes its overly sunny conclusion with several significant "ifs" whose fulfillment is not overly likely, particularly given the likely winner of the U.S. presidential election.  Said "ifs" do not appear to have even occurred to StratFor's George Friedman, who is far more focused on the realpolitik of the great power realities of what he calls "The REAL World Order".

Point #1: Despite being the unchallenged planetary hegemon, the U.S. is having to field national security threats faster than even its resources can keep up with:

Its ground forces and the bulk of its logistical capability are committed to the Middle East, particularly Iraq and Afghanistan. The United States also is threatening on occasion to go to war with Iran, which would tie down most of its air power, and it is facing a destabilizing Pakistan. Therefore, there is this paradox: The United States is so powerful that, in the long run, it has created an imbalance in the global system. In the short run, however, it is so off balance that it has few, if any, military resources to deal with challenges elsewhere. That means that the United States remains the dominant power in the long run but it cannot exercise that power in the short run. This creates a window of opportunity for other countries to act.

Point #2: The reason we can't keep all these brushfire plates spinning any more is because we spent too long dicking around in Iraq:

The outcome of the Iraq war can be seen emerging. The United States has succeeded in creating the foundations for a political settlement among the main Iraqi factions that will create a relatively stable government. In that sense, U.S. policy has succeeded. But the problem the United States has is the length of time it took to achieve this success. Had it occurred in 2003, the United States would not suffer its current imbalance. But this is 2008, more than five years after the invasion. The United States never expected a war of this duration, nor did it plan for it. In order to fight the war, it had to inject a major portion of its ground fighting capability into it. The length of the war was the problem. U.S. ground forces are either in Iraq, recovering from a tour or preparing for a deployment. What strategic reserves are available are tasked into Afghanistan. Little is left over.

Point #3: We did not take care of business a lot sooner in Iraq, as well as liberate Iran and Syria, while the window of opportunity was open five years ago.  Yet we pursued President Bush's Wilsonian democracy fetish in Russia's "near abroad" without taking into account a negative Russian reaction to it that, if it materialized - as it now has in Georgia - we would have little or no means of counteracting.  Call it "potential overextension" that got realized, leaving us with no other direction to go except in reverse:

In spite of diminishing military options outside of the Middle East, the United States did not modify its policy in the former Soviet Union. It continued to aggressively attempt to influence countries in the region, and it became particularly committed to integrating Ukraine and Georgia into NATO, in spite of the fact that both were of overwhelming strategic interest to the Russians. Ukraine dominated Russia’s southwestern flank, without any natural boundaries protecting them. Georgia was seen as a constant irritant in Chechnya as well as a barrier to Russian interests in the Caucasus.

Moving rapidly to consolidate U.S. control over these and other countries in the former Soviet Union made strategic sense. Russia was weak, divided and poorly governed. It could make no response. Continuing this policy in the 2000s, when the Russians were getting stronger, more united and better governed and while U.S. forces were no longer available, made much less sense. The United States continued to irritate the Russians without having, in the short run, the forces needed to act decisively.

The combination of #2 and #3 meant that Moscow had its own window of opportunity to begin rebuilding its empire before we could finish the job in Iraq and free up forces for "redeployment" elsewhere - such as the Caucasus.  Unlike us, they seized their opportunity while they could, and now the entire template of global alignments has irretrievably changed.

But we all know what the real unfinished business for the U.S. is in the Middle East, and it's several hundred miles to the south:

[T]he Russians had an additional lever for use on the Americans: Iran.

The United States had been playing a complex game with Iran for years, threatening to attack while trying to negotiate. The Americans needed the Russians. Sanctions against Iran would have no meaning if the Russians did not participate, and the United States did not want Russia selling advance air defense systems to Iran. (Such systems, which American analysts had warned were quite capable, were not present in Syria on September 6, 2007, when the Israelis struck a nuclear facility there.) As the United States re-evaluates the Russian military, it does not want to be surprised by Russian technology. Therefore, the more aggressive the United States becomes toward Russia, the greater the difficulties it will have in Iran. This further encouraged the Russians to act sooner rather than later.

Thus leading to Friedman's novel conclusion/recommendation: a Russo-American grand bargain:

The Russians have now proven two things. First, contrary to the reality of the 1990s, they can execute a competent military operation. Second, contrary to regional perception, the United States cannot intervene....

We would expect the Russians to get traction. But if they don’t, the Russians are aware that they are, in the long run, much weaker than the Americans, and that they will retain their regional position of strength only while the United States is off balance in Iraq. If the lesson isn’t absorbed, the Russians are capable of more direct action, and they will not let this chance slip away. This is their chance to redefine their sphere of influence. They will not get another.

....[T]he Russians are waiting for the Americans to calm down and get serious. If the Americans plan to take meaningful action against them, they will respond in Iran. But the Americans have no meaningful actions they can take; they need to get out of Iraq and they need help against Iran. The quid pro quo here is obvious. The United States acquiesces to Russian actions (which it can’t do anything about), while the Russians cooperate with the United States against Iran getting nuclear weapons (something Russia does not want to see).

Throw Georgia - and by implication the rest of the former Soviet "republics," who will inevitably knuckle under to Czar Vlad sooner or later regardless - under the bus in exchange for Russian "assistance" in neutralizing Iran.

While Friedman's supporting arguments are sound, his conclusion is quasi-Obamaesque in its wishful thinking quotient.  It is illogical to suggest that Russia does not want to see a nuclear Iran when Russia has been Iran's principle nuclear technology and fuel supplier for over a decade.  Why would they want to cooperate with us in shutting down the mullahgarchy's visions of Armageddon and the return of the Twelfth Imam when the only conceivable strategic purpose of nuclearizing Iran in the first place was to tie us down so they could have a free hand in "Prime Minister" Putin's neoSovietization?

Friedman's quid pro quo sounds to me like three more magic beans.  We would be endorsing our borderline humiliation in Georgia, admitting weakness on Iran, in exchange for the "promise" of "assistance" from a man who has already lied repeatedly and flagrantly ever since his tanks crossed the Georgian border and against whose own strategic interests he would be acting.  The mullahs would become even more emboldened to produce and "deploy" their nukes, as well as reignite chaos in Iraq, keeping us tied down there even longer, or more likely forcing our retreat from there, and eventually from Afghanistan and that entire part of the world.

In the end, our options vis-a-vie the Caucasus are indeed slim and none.  We're not going to go to war with Russia over Georgia, Iraq or no Iraq.  We can only apply what "soft power" measures we can and hope it stalls Putin's imperialism long enough for us to "regain our balance."

Similarly, the Russians are going to fight us indirectly in and with Iran no matter what we do.  We therefore have to "disarm" Iran anyway.  That is the most immediate and mortal national security threat we face.  Whether or not we "need help" - and I don't think we do - succor will never come from Tehran's principle nuclear vendor and protector on the UN Security Council.

Meanwhile, back in Russian-occupied Georgia, Czar Vlad has ordered the ethnic cleansing of Georgian cities, sent his forces to close in on the capital of Tbilisi with reinforcements pouring in right behind them - all after not one, but two cease-fires were supposed to have the Russians withdrawing to their own territory.  His "Sudetenland strategy" is marking the Baltic states, Ukraine, Kazakhstan for similar "protection."

And he may be making a prophet out of me yet again:

President Hugo Chavez said on Sunday that Russian President Dimitri Medvedev wants to send a Russian naval fleet to visit Venezuela.

“Russia has informed us they intend to visit Venezuela, that is, the intention that a Russian fleet should come to the Caribbean,” Chavez said on his weekly radio program.

“I told the president (Medvedev), ‘If you’re coming to the Caribbean, we’ll welcome you,’” Chavez said, adding that the Russian naval fleet would pay “a friendly and working” visit to Venezuela…

“We very much need them here,” Chavez said of the Russian weapons. “We’ve got the helicopters, the Sukoi fighters and we’re now considering buying some Russian submarines to patrol our territorial waters,” Chavez said.

A "working" visit, hmm?  Russian submarines to "patrol their territorial waters," or ours?  Just what other hardware might that fleet be delivering?

Doesn't look to me like that seriously crazed-up fruit loop is aware he's overplayed his hand.  So who's going to convince him - and how?